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Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend
with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem
is centrally important to the use of carbon offsets to mitigate climate change. We analyze optimal contracts
for forest carbon, an important offset category. A novel national-scale simulation of the contracts is
conducted that uses econometric results derived from micro data. For a 50 million acre increase in
forest area, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are found to be about $4 billion
lower compared to costs with a uniform subsidy.
Charles Mason
Department of Economics and Finance
University of Wyoming
1000 E. University Avenue










road construction, prisons, and national security. Studies in the contracting literature examine
the principal’s problem of minimizing the costs of procuring goods when agents have private
information about their costs (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Lewis, 1996; Rogerson, 2003; Mon-
tero, 2005). In this paper, we study an important case involving cost-based procurement of
an impure public good. An impure public good has both private and public characteristics
(Kotchen, 2006; Cornes and Sandler, 1994). The private good feature of impure public goods
has the potential to raise the government’s cost substantially if there are many agents who
supply the good primarily for its private attributes. In addition to the usual complication of
low-cost agents masquerading as high-cost agents, the government must contend with agents
who would potentially supply the good in the absence of any payments. The latter problem,
referred to as additionality, is a central issue in current international efforts to limit climate
change.1 We analyze the government’s problem of contracting for carbon offsets, which in
many important cases are jointly produced with private goods.
As we enter the second decade of the 21st century there is an emerging consensus that
carbon emissions must be limited. But there is also a strong sense that cutting emissions can
be very costly, particularly if conventional sources of energy are heavily taxed or abandoned.
One way to reduce the costs of carbon reduction that has received a great deal of attention
is offsets. The idea is that countries could meet emissions targets by substituting lower-cost
1 Additionality also arises with government subsidies for R&D and job creation (Picard, 2001; Gorg and
Strobl, 2007).
1offsets for reductions in emissions from energy production. Carbon sequestration in forests
is one promising type of offset. Numerous studies have found that forest sequestration can
be used to offset a substantial share of carbon emissions at costs that are similar to or lower
than those associated with energy-based mitigation approaches (Richards and Stokes, 2004;
van Kooten et al., 2004; Stavins and Richards, 2005). Other offset categories include carbon
storage in agricultural soils and the transfer of clean energy technologies to developing coun-
tries not subject to emissions targets. Some types of forest and energy offsets are allowed
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, and there is interest
in expanding their use under future agreements.2
The additionality of offsets is important in two respects. First, governments will want
to avoid paying for non-additional offsets in order to limit their expenditures.3 The govern-
ment costs associated with purchases of offsets could be enormous. For example, in the U.S.
an average of 1.3 million acres was deforested annually between 1982 and 1997 (USDA,
2000). While this produced signiﬁcant carbon emissions that might be avoided at reasonable
social cost, one must consider that the area of (non-federal) forest in the U.S. is approximately
400 million acres. If the government were to implement a subsidy for avoided deforestation
and apply it uniformly across all forested acres, then in the extreme case it would subsidize
all forest land when less than 1% of the area would have been deforested.4 Second, to legit-
2 See, e.g., UNFCCC (2005). In principle, all carbon sources and sinks could be included under an emis-
sions control policy, such as a cap-and-trade program. There are practical obstacles to this approach in the case
of offsets from forests and agricultural lands due to the large and diverse population of landowners and apparent
political obstacles–as suggested by the Kyoto Protocol negotiations–in the case of developing countries.
3 One could argue that government expenditures are welfare-neutral, and thus economically irrelevant, be-
cause government costs are simply transfer payments from one set of agents in the economy to another. We have
two responses. First, governments are commonly concerned with the budgetary effects of policies, as witnessed,
for example, by debates over the size of the recent federal stimulus package in the U.S. Second, there are standard
economic arguments that public funds have opportunity costs and, thus, reduce net social beneﬁts.
4 The Conservation Reserve Program is an example of a land conservation policy in the U.S. that, in its
2imately use offsets to meet emissions reduction targets, countries must be able to verify that
offsets are additional; procedures that fail to clearly identify the increment of sequestration
produced have been soundly criticized (Richards and Andersson, 2001).
In this paper, we describe a contracting scheme for carbon offsets and investigate its
performanceempiricallywithanational-scalesimulation. Ourtheoreticalmodeladaptsastan-
dard principal-agent framework (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Salani´ e, 2005) to the problem at
hand. The principal’s objective is to maximize expected net beneﬁts from forestation,5 where
forestation beneﬁts are tied to an exogenously determined carbon price and costs are deﬁned
in terms of government expenditures. The problem is one of moral hazard: the principal is
assumed to know the distribution over landowners’ opportunity costs, but not the realization
for any particular individual.6 In the maximization problem we investigate, the optimality
conditions induce a set of optimal contracts, one for each type of agent. Each contract has
two ingredients: a per-unit payment, and a lump-sum transfer (from the agent to the govern-
ment). The essential feature of the contract scheme is that it induces agents to truthfully reveal
their type (i.e., their opportunity costs). This enables the government to identify ex post how
much additional forest is contributed by each landowner. Further, the government is able to
initial phase, relied on uniform subsidies (Smith, 1995). Of course, the government can avoid large expenditures
by levying taxes instead of paying subsidies. We regard this option as politically unviable, especially in the
context of private landowners in the U.S.
5 Conversion of non-forest lands to forest is referred to as afforestation, while maintenance of land in forest
is avoided deforestation. We use the term forestation to refer collectively to these activities.
6 Accordingly, it cannot identify the amount of land the landowner would place in forest, with or without a
payment. van Benthem and Kerr (2010) consider a similar framework to ours, but do not consider the potential
for the principal to reduce information rents by the use of two-part contracts; instead, they focus on the role of
landowner size on contract efﬁciency. Using a variation of the law of large numbers, they argue that efﬁciency
increases with the size of the landowner’s holdings. Montero (2008) considers a problem of adverse selection,
in which the government wishes to buy a certain amount of offsets from a group of ﬁrms whose costs are private
information. In his model, once a ﬁrm commits to a certain amount of offsets its actions can be perfectly
monitored. In this framework, Montero constructs an auction mechanism that induces ﬁrms to perfectly reveal
their cost curves.
3minimize ex ante its expenditures on forestation.
Wethenpresentanational-scalesimulationoftheoptimalcontractsbasedonindividual-
level data. The analysis draws on the econometric model of land-use change developed by
Lubowski et al. (2006). We use the model to estimate marginal costs distributions for foresta-
tion and, with these estimates, compute the optimal contract menus using the theoretical re-
sults. We compare costs (both government costs and private opportunity costs) under the
contracting approach to the costs of a uniform subsidy offered to all landowners. The results
show that government costs are considerably lower under the optimal contracts than under
the uniform subsidy. However, because the optimal contract scheme sets different subsidies
for different agents, it violates the equi-marginal principle. This social cost inefﬁciency turns
out to be small in relation to the reduction in government outlays associated with the optimal
contract scheme. Thus, the contract scheme will be preferable at the social level as well, so
long as there is a modest cost of social funds.
We believe ours is the ﬁrst paper to combine modern contract theory with a careful ap-
plication of econometric results based on a concrete example.7 As such, we are able to obtain
meaningful estimates of the costs associated with employing optimal contracts, to both princi-
pal and agents, as well as the costs under perfect information (i.e., the ﬁrst-best outcome) and
under a common per-unit subsidy that yields the identical level of forestation. These estimates
7 While one can ﬁnd papers that apply modern contracting theory to speciﬁc problems, these applications
generally use casual empirical evidence to ﬂesh out particular examples, rather than incorporating detailed econo-
metric evidence into the problem (e.g., Bourgeon et al. (1995). One can also ﬁnd empirical studies of existing
contracts (e.g., Babcock et al. (1997) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2008)). As a general rule, these researchers
do not have information about the distribution over agents’ marginal costs, and so cannot investigate the relation
between observed behavior and contracting theory. Nemes et al. (2008) conduct an experimental analysis of an
offset problem; as with most experimental papers, they analyze behavior by ﬁnancially motivated subjects, rather
than naturally observed behavior.
4allow us to articulate the potential welfare gains from the use of sophisticated contracts that
are based on defensible, empirically-based parameter values. Importantly, our results show
these potential welfare gains are signiﬁcant, in a variety of geographical contexts.
The paper proceeds with a description of the theoretical model in section 2. In section
3, we present a national-scale simulation of the optimal contracts based on individual-level
data. Section 4 presents the results from this simulation analysis; there we show that govern-
ment costs are considerably lower under the optimal contracts than under the uniform subsidy,
and are much closer to ﬁrst-best costs. Further discussion and conclusions are provided in
section 5.
2 Theoretical statement of the problem
We suppose there is a governmental agency, which we term the “principal,” that is interested
in having land placed in forest. Each unit of land placed in forest generates an amount of
sequestration, which yields a beneﬁt Pc to the principal. This induced beneﬁt can naturally be
thought of as a value of marginal product, which depends on the price of carbon (which can
either be explicit, if a formal carbon market exists, or implicit, as with an emissions trading
scheme) and the marginal product of forest land in a sequestration production function.8 For
expositional concreteness, we will refer to Pc as the ’value of marginal product’ (VMP) in
the pursuant discussion, with the understanding that this VMP is deﬁned with respect to the
production of sequestration services. The land that may be placed in forest is managed by a
private entity, whom we call the “agent.” In practice, the principal will interact with a number
8 This interpretation implicitly assumes that each acre of land stores the same quantity of carbon.
5of agents; in our description of the model we focus on the interaction with a canonical agent.
Agents are characterized by their type q, which is private information. Each agent would
place an amount of land in forest absent any subsidy; we will interpret the agent’s type as this
amount. The set of possible types is Q = [q;q]. An agent’s type determines his opportunity
cost of placing an amount of land x in forest; since the agent would willingly place q in forest
at price 0 we assume this opportunity cost is an increasing, convex function of the additional
amount of land placed in forest, c(x q). With such a speciﬁcation both total and marginal
costs are decreasing in type: ¶c=¶q =  c0(x q) < 0;¶2c=¶x¶q =  c00(x q) < 0: Let the
probability distribution over q be f(q) and the cumulative distribution function be F(q); we
assume these distribution functions are continuous in q, and that the hazard rate h(q)=
f(q)
1 F(q)
is increasing in q.9 We assume the principal is unable to observe q ex ante but does know the
distribution over q.








where x(q) is the amount of land an agent of type q places in forest based on the contract
scheme adopted by the principal. (Equivalently, one can regard the principal’s goal as mini-
mizing expected net outlays.) To maximize W, the principal offers the agent a menu of con-




, where p(q) is interpreted as a per-unit subsidy and T(q) is
interpreted as a transfer from the agent to the principal.10
9 The hazard rate is the conditional probability an agent’s type belongs to the interval [q;q+dq], given the
agent is known to be of type q or larger. The condition h0(q) > 0 holds for many distributions, including the one
we employ in the empirical application we discuss below.
10 One can think of this transfer as reﬂecting a sort of ‘clawback,’ or that the payment p(q) only applies to
6Denote the proﬁt earned by a type q agent who chooses the contract intended for a type
ˆ q agent by
P(ˆ q;q) = p(ˆ q)x(ˆ q;q) c(x(ˆ q;q) q) T(ˆ q):
The incentive constraint requires that P is maximized at ˆ q = q:
0 = ¶P(q;q)=¶ˆ q = p0(q)x(q;q)+[p(q) c0(x(q;q) q)(¶x=¶ˆ q) T0(q):
As the agent’s choice of x is optimal it must satisfy c0(x(ˆ q;q) q) = p(ˆ q); it follows that the
incentive constraint can be written as
T0(q) = p0(q)x(q;q): (1)
Associated with this problem, an agent of type q may earn information rents
n(q) = p(q)x c(x q) T(q): (2)
Information rents change with q as follows:
n0(q) = [p c0(x q)]¶x=¶q+c0(x q)+[p0(q)x T0(q)]
= c0(x q); (3)
units of land after some z(q). In this way, the principal would retain the amount p(q)z(q), which would represent
the transfer component T(q) in the contract. Alternatively, one can think of the transfer as a fraction b of revenue
that depends on the agent’s type; in this case T(q) = p(q)x(q)b(q).
7where the ﬁrst square-bracketed term vanishes by the optimality of x and the second square-
bracketed term vanishes because of the incentive compatibility constraint. Intuitively, an agent
can guarantee a positive payoff by imitating a lower type agent; this guaranteed payoff is the
agent’s information rent. Equation (3) tells us that the information rent is larger for larger type
agents. Because the principal wishes to minimize expected net outlays, the net outlays paid to
each agent type are equal to that agent type’s information rent, and the schedule of information
rents is indexed by the rent paid to the lowest-type agent, it follows that the optimal menu of
contracts sets the lowest type agent’s information rents to zero: n(q) = 0 (Salani´ e, 2005).








Applying integration by parts to the component of the integrand involving  n(q)f(q), and









Maximizing W at any given value of q, and taking note of equation (3), yields the














8In addition, the optimal contract scheme must satisfy the participation constraint — that no
agent can earn negative proﬁts at his choice. The solution to equation (5), combined with the
condition that n(q) = 0 and the participation constraint, yields the second-best value of land
placed in forest as a function of q.
Because the agent will choose x so that p = c0, the envelope theorem implies c00 =








The left-hand side of eq. (6) represents the marginal gain associated with increasing p slightly
(thereby increasing the amount of land in forest). The opportunity cost of increasing p(q)
slightly is measured by the inverse of the hazard rate, the right-hand side of eq. (6); this
derives from the fact that all higher q types would then be tempted to misrepresent themselves.
To prevent such opportunistic behavior, the principal would then be obliged to increase price
for all these higher values of q. Eq. (6) can be manipulated to produce an explicit rule for





11 Depending on the particular functional relation x(p) and the hazard rate h(q), the right-hand side of eq.
(7) could be negative. Negative values of p(q) would in turn imply negative operating proﬁts, and thereby force
the principal to pay the agent lump-sum subsidies. Since such a scheme would result in non-negative combined
payments to this type of agent, while inducing less land in forest than would obtain at a price of zero, a contract
scheme that includes negative prices is apparently infeasible. With this interpretation, there would be a cutoff
value ˜ q, where agents with smaller values of q opt out of the contracting scheme; the participation constraint then
implies the boundary condition n(˜ q) = 0.
9Noting that F(q) = 1, we must have either p(q) = Pc or x0(p(q)) = 0; we would typically
expect the former branch to apply. Moreover, because information rents increase with q, we
expect p0(q) > 0 and T0(q) > 0 for interior solutions.12
The contracting scheme produces important information about the additional amount
offorestprovidedbyagents(andhencetheassociatedsequestrationservices). Asaby-product
of the contracting scheme, and in return for paying information rents, the principal learns
the amount of land that would have been placed in forest in the absence of any ﬁnancial
incentives; comparing this to the amount placed in land under the contracting scheme deﬁnes
the additional amount. By contrast,were the principal to offer some simpler form of incentive,
such as the common per-acre subsidy we consider below, they would only know the expected
amount of additional forest.
The optimal contract scheme for a problem with two agent types is illustrated in Figure
1. In this diagram, one type of agent has a low q (=q0; we term this agent ‘low type’), and one
type has a high q (= q1; we term this agent ‘high type’). The types of agent are equally likely,
and aside from differences in their q’s the agents’ costs are the same (hence, their marginal
cost curves are parallel). Under the optimal contract scheme, the principal offers the agent the
choice of prices pH and pL; the transfer payments TL;TH are set so that a type i agent would
choosetheprice pi;i=L;H. Attheprice pL, thelowtypewouldchoosexL. Sincetheoptimal
contract scheme sets the transfer payment TL so as to extract all the low type’s surplus, it must
equal the low type’s operating proﬁt, area A1. At the price pH, the high type would choose
12 For the interior solution to obtain, the second-order condition G =  x0(p)+(Pc  p)x00(p) < 0 must also
be satisﬁed. In light of eq. (6), G is proportional to  h0(q); the assumption that the hazard rate h is increasing in
q then ensures the second-order condition holds.
10xH. The incentive compatibility constraint implies the transfer payment associated with the
high price, TH, renders this type of agent indifferent between ‘telling the truth’ (choosing the
high price) and ‘lying’ (choosing the low price). Accordingly, the high type winds up with
proﬁtsequivalentto thelevelhe would obtainwerehe tomisrepresenthimselfasa lowtype. In
that event he would choose xHL, and earn operating proﬁt equal to the sum of the areas A1 and
A2. From this operating proﬁt he would have to forfeit the transfer payment described above,
which would then leave him with a net proﬁt equal to the parallelogram A2—this corresponds
to his information rent. Total expected government expenditures under the optimal contract
scheme are thus equal to these information rents, plus the costs born by a high type at xH,
multiplied by 1
2 (the probability of observing a high type), plus the costs born by a low type at
xL, multiplied by 1
2.
By contrast, the same expected level of acreage could be induced if all agents were
offered the price pa =
pL+pH
2 (the expected price). At that price, low types would select x
L
and high types would select x
H . Since the government knows that all agents would offer at
least q0 without payment, it seems reasonable that the price pa only be offered for levels above
















It is straightforward, though tedious, to verify that the government’s expected costs are smaller
undertheoptimalcontractscheme. Thiscostsavingscomesattheexpenseofsomewhathigher
privatecosts, inthatthesecostswouldbeloweratthecommonpriceofPa (becauseoftheequi-
11marginal principle). Nevertheless, so long as the social cost of funds is sufﬁciently large, the
imputed beneﬁts accruing from limiting government expenditures will outweigh the welfare
cost attributable to asymmetric costs at the margin.
Before moving on to the empirical analysis, we brieﬂy discuss the ﬁrst-best arrange-
ment. If the principal could identify any agent’s true costs, its optimal scheme would be to
offer each agent a common price of Pc, and then extract the agent’s surplus proﬁt by setting
the transfer payment equal to proﬁts. In that case, no agent earns any information rents.
3 Empirical Analysis of Carbon Sequestration Contracts
We conduct a national-level simulation of the carbon sequestration contracts. Two key ingre-
dients for the simulation are the q distributions and the forest response functions x(p). These
are derived using the econometric model of land use developed by Lubowski et al. (2006)
to derive the supply function for carbon sequestration in forests. These authors estimate a
discrete-choice model of private land-use decisions using parcel-level data. The random util-
ity framework is naturally suited to our principal-agent problem. Landowners are assumed to
allocate their land to the use that maximizes utility, where utility has a deterministic compo-
nent, observed by all, and a random component. The landowner observes the realization of
the random variable, but the researcher only knows its distribution. Thus, the random util-
ity model assumes asymmetric information between the researcher and the landowner. We
adopt the same information structure for our principal-agent problem, where the agent has
perfect information and the principal knows only the distribution of the random component of
12landowner utility. We interpret a landholder as having one unit of land, and so the amount of
an agent’s land in forest also equals the fraction of the agent’s land in forest. The amount of
forest at a larger geographical level, such as a state, can then be found by aggregating over all
agents within the cohort. As we treat all agents within a particular state and land class as ex
ante identical, multiplying the predicted share of an agent’s land in forest by the total amount
of land in the land class for that state will yield the expected amount of land allocated to forest.
In the Lubowski et al. model, utility is represented by net returns, a measure of the
variable proﬁts per acre from each land use. Land parcels begin in one of six uses (cropland,
pasture, forest, urban, Conservation Reserve Program, range) and are assumed to be allocated
to the use generating the highest level of net returns. Because of the random component of
net returns, land-use decisions are a probabilistic phenomenon from the perspective of the
principal. Estimation of the model yields land-use transition probabilities of the following
form:
ˆ Pijkt = f(Xc(i)t;Yi; ˆ b b bjk); (8)
where i indexes parcels, j indexes the starting use, k indexes the ending use, and t indexes
time. Thus, equation (8) signiﬁes the probability that parcel i changes from use j to use k
during the time period beginning in t.13 Probabilities are a logistic function f of observable
variablesXc(i)t andYi, wherec(i)isafunctionthatmapsfromparcelitothecountyinwhichit
is located. Thus, Xc(i)t is a vector of county-level variables (speciﬁcally, average county-level
net returns to each use) and Yi is a vector of parcel-level variables (speciﬁcally, measures of
13 Lubowski et al. (2006) estimate the land-use model with data from the National Resources Inventory
(NRI), a panel survey of land use in the U.S. conducted at 5-year intervals over the 1982 to 1997. Due to the
structure of the data, the probabilities correspond to land-use changes over a 5-year period.
13plot-level land quality that are used to scale county average returns and to proxy for conversion
costs). ˆ b b bjk is a vector of estimated parameters speciﬁc to the j-to-k transition. We denote the
estimated covariance matrix for the full set of parameters as ˆ V.
According to the sampling scheme underlying the land-use data, each parcel i repre-
sents a certain number of acres Ai. If parcel i is initially in use j, this corresponds to Aij acres
in this use. If k indexes an alternative use, the expected amount of Aij allocated to use k by the
end of the 5-year time period beginning in t is Aij  ˆ Pijkt. More generally, if Ait is a vector of
acres by use in period t and ˆ Pit is a 66 matrix of transition probabilities, then
Ait+N = Ait  ˆ PN
it (9)
gives the expected acres in each use N periods in the future. Because forests require several
decades or more to grow to maturity, our application is necessarily concerned with land-use
change over long periods of time. We adopt a planning horizon of 100 years (i.e., N = 20
periods).
Land-use allocations many years in the future are subject to great uncertainty. We
represent this uncertainty using the distributions on the estimated parameters from the econo-
metric model. Using ˆ V, we randomly draw 1000 parameter vectors ˆ b b b
m
jk, where m indexes
draws. By substitution of ˆ b b b
m
jk into equation (8) for all j and k we obtain the matrix of transi-
tion probabilities ˆ Pm
it. We then apply the Markov chain in equation (9) to the vector of initial
acres, Ai0, to obtain the expected number of acres in 20 periods (i.e., 100 years), ˆ Am
i20, for each
parcel i and draw m.
14To ease the burden of computing the optimal contracts, and to correspond to a scale
at which carbon contracts might actually be implemented, we aggregate parcels within states
or groups of states. States with little private forest (North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Nevada, and Arizona, and the western portions of Oklahoma and Texas) are dropped
and small states are combined (the southern New England states, the northern New England
states, and the mid-Atlantic states of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland). As well, based
on climatic similarities, we reconﬁgure Oregon and Washington as the western and eastern
portions of these states, and combine the eastern portions of Oklahoma and Texas. Henceforth,
the term “state” will be used to refer to one of the thirty-ﬁve states, groups of states, or portions
of states considered in the analysis. Within a state, differences in the quality of land produce
differencesintheopportunitycostsof forestation (StavinsandJaffe,1990). Intheeconometric
model, this heterogeneity is captured by Yi = (Y1i;Y2i;Y3i;Y4i), whereYqi is a dummy variable
indicating if parcel i is in land quality class q = 1;:::4. Land quality classes are ordered from
highest-quality (q = 1) to lowest-quality (q = 4). Within each state, we aggregate only parcels
of the same quality. Thus, we implement the contract scheme separately for 435=140 state
and land quality combinations.
Following the aggregation, we have 1000 replicates of Am
sq20, for each state s and land
quality class q. The element of Am
sq20 that is of central importance to us is the one correspond-
ing to the area of forest 100 years in the future. This variable, when expressed as a percentage
of the maximum possible forest area, deﬁnes qm
sq, the share of land in state s and quality class
q that is allocated to forest in the future in the absence of any carbon sequestration incen-
15tives.14 The maximum possible forest area is deﬁned as the total area of private land in crops,
pasture, forest, and range.15 This measure excludes urban land, which we assume cannot be
converted back to undeveloped uses, and federal lands, which are managed by U.S. govern-
ment agencies. Our measure of maximum forest area likely overstates the potential forest area
in those Rocky Mountain states where tree growth is limited by climatic conditions, especially
moisture availability. We return to this issue below.
Consistent with the theoretical model, we assume that q is distributed logistic.16 For




to the 1000 replicates of qm
sq over the interval [qsq;qsq], where qsq (respectively, qsq) is the
minimum (respectively, maximum) value of qm
sq in the list of 1000 replicates.17 Across states,
the average values of qsq and qsq are 0.01 and 0.44, respectively, for the highest-quality lands
(q = 1). For lowest-quality lands (q = 4), the average values of qsq and qsq are 0.43 and 0.70,
respectively. Agriculture tends to be more proﬁtable than forestry on higher quality lands and,
thus, relatively small shares of high quality land are forested in the absence of government
payments. Forestry tends to be more proﬁtable on lower quality lands and, in most states, a
14 The unobserved component of landowner utility implies there is a strictly positive probability that each
land parcel will be put into forest.
15 The NRI does not identify lands owned by states and counties and, thus, they are included in our measure
of maximum forest area. These public lands do not represent a large share of the land base in any state and, in
many cases, are forested.
16 The estimates of q produced from the econometric model are 20th-order polynomial functions of logistic
probabilities. We approximate the true distribution with a simple logistic in order to simplify the computation of
the optimal contracts.
17 The estimated values of qsq and qsq are reported in Table A.1 in the appendix; the estimates of f0sq and
f1sq are available from the authors upon request.
16large share of low quality land is forested without incentives.
The next step in the analysis is to derive the response function x(p). We assume this
function is a quadratic:
x(p) = a+d0p+d1p2: (11)
The intercept of this function represents the average amount of forest land that would be
allocated at a price of zero (i.e., the mean of q), which is induced by the distribution over q.
To estimate the coefﬁcients d0 and d1 for each land quality category in each state, we follow
Stavins (1999) and modify the transition probabilities in equation (8) by introducing an annual
per-acre subsidy or tax p.18 This yields:
ˆ Pijkt = f(Xc(i)t +p;Yi; ˆ b b bjk); (12)
for all i; j;k. As placing land in forest represents the third possible use, p = (0;0;p;0;0;0)
if k = 3 , j (land goes into forest), p = ( p; p;0; p; p; p) if j = 3 , k (land goes out
of forest), and p = (0;0;0;0;0;0) otherwise. Thus, transitions into forest are subsidized by p
and transitions out of forest are taxed by p. Using, again, randomly drawn parameter vectors,
we repeat the above procedure and predict future land use for each state and land quality class
and for subsidy/tax values p = 25;50;:::;250. This yields multiple observations of the share
of the potential forested area that is forested after 100 years, at different values of p and for
each state and land quality class. Sets of observations of x and p are used to estimate the price
18 In principle, p could emerge from a variety of policies, including the optimal contracting scheme we
outlined in the previous section. For the purposes of our deriving the x(p) function, however, the source of this
tax or subsidy is not important. All that matters is that its presence changes the payoff from forestation, relative
to other options.
17coefﬁcients of x(p) for each state and land quality class.19
4 Simulation Results
By combining equations (10) - (11) with the results from section 2, we are able to simulate
the optimal menu of contracts for each land class within each state for a range of VMPs.20
The simulated contracts can then be used to calculate the expected amount of land in forest,
by state and land class, and the associated cost to the principal. We can also use information
regarding the distribution over q and the x(p) function to determine the constant subsidy that
would induce the same amount of land in forest.21 This allows us to compare the expected
costs under the optimal contract with the constant subsidy scheme.
Table 1 presents the results of the empirical analysis of carbon contracts for a VMP of
$100.22 The second and third columns report the maximum forest area for each state and the
increase in forest area under the contracts.23 Across all states, approximately 52 million acres
of forest would be added or conserved, which represents about 5.3% of the maximum potential
forest. The largest gains, in absolute and percentage terms, are predicted in Rocky Mountain
19 The estimation results are presented in Table A.2 in the appendix. While one would expect a positive
relationship between the net return to a use and the probability that land will be converted to or remain in that
use, the transition probabilities are a function of the net returns to all land uses. This can result in complicated
cross-effects when subsidy/tax incentives are introduced (Lubowski, 2002) and produce a negative coefﬁcient on
price. In our application, this counterintuitive outcome arose in a small number of cases. These cases are omitted
from the analysis, and left blank in Table A.2.
20 Details of the derivation are contained in the Appendix.
21 Part of the simulation exercise is the determination of the smallest value of q at which an agent would
just be willing to participate. In our applications, this cutoff value was larger than q in all but a small number of
cases.
22 Here and below, we express the VMP values and all cost estimates in annual terms. Lubowski et al. (2006)
ﬁnd that a per-acre payment of $100 translates into a carbon price of approximately $50 per ton of carbon.
23 Results disaggregated by land quality classes and for other VMPs are available from the authors upon
request.
18states such as Utah, Montana, and Wyoming. As discussed above, these states contain arid
regions where forestation is limited by moisture availability. As a check on our results, we
compared our predictions of forest area under the contracts with state-level estimates of the
area of private land that can support forests. These estimates are based on ﬁne-scale measures
of moisture availability (annual deﬁcit and evapotranspiration) that determine the dominant
potential vegetation type (e.g., coniferous forests, tallgrass prairie) (Stephenson, 1998). In
all cases, our predictions were within the limits imposed by climatic conditions. Relatively
large increases in forest area are also predicted for some states in the Midwest, such as eastern
Oklahoma and Texas and Minnesota, and small increases are predicted for most eastern states.
The general pattern is that larger forest gains occur where there is abundant land with low
opportunity costs, such as rangelands in the Rocky Mountain region.
As in the example presented in Figure 1, the next two columns of Table 1 report the
government expenditures under the contracts compared to a subsidy that pays landowners the
same amount per acre. At a given VMP, the increase in forest area tends to be larger with the
subsidy than with the contracts. Thus, to make the expenditures comparable, we set forest area
equal to the area under the contracts and calculate the corresponding subsidy that would yield
this area using the estimated forest response functions in Table A.2. The government expendi-
tures under the contracts are calculated by summing the payments to landowners across types
and subtracting the transfer payments they make back to the government. To compute the
costs under the subsidy policy, we multiply the per-acre subsidy by the forest area provided
by each landowner type net of the area that the highest cost type would provide for free.
Our key ﬁnding is that government expenditures are dramatically lower under the con-
19tracts than under a subsidy policy. At a carbon price of $100, the optimal contracts increase
forestareaby52millionacresnationwide, atanannualcosttothegovernmentof$3.09billion.
To achieve the same increase in forest area with a uniformly-applied subsidy, the government
would have to spend over twice as much, about $6.86 billion. On a state-by-state basis, there
is considerable variation in relative expenditures. Although subsidies are always more expen-
sive for the government than contracts, they differ by a factor of 2 or less in many states (e.g.,
Indiana and Iowa) but by a factor of 5 or more in South Carolina, Georgia, and elsewhere.
These differences can be traced back to the slopes of the forest response functions in Table
A.2.
While government expenditures under the contracts are roughly 45% of the level that
would obtain under a uniform subsidy, one naturally wonders about the difference in private
opportunity costs under the two policies. Because the uniform subsidy equates the marginal
costs of forestation across agents (i.e., satisﬁes the equi-marginal principle), we know that it
will minimize the private opportunity costs associated with the increases in forest area. In
contrast, under the contracts prices vary by type. A comparison of these costs for each state is
given in the last columns of Table 1. Annual private opportunity costs are about $2.02 billion
on a national scale under the contracts, compared to $1.77 billion under the subsidy policy.24
In contrast to government expenditures, there is less variation among states in the differences
between private opportunity costs (western Oregon and Washington is an exception). In most
states, opportunity costs differ by less than a factor of 2.
24 Thus, the increase in private opportunity costs corresponds to 6.6% of the governmental cost savings.
Thus, if the cost of public funds exceeds $.07 per dollar raised the use of the optimal contracting scheme is
socially advantageous, as well as cost-saving from the governmental agency’s perspective.
20To get a sense for the robustness of these results to variations in the VMP, we repeat
the cost calculations for values ranging from $25 to $150; the results are summarized in Fig-
ure 2. As the VMP increases, it is optimal to convert more land to forest and so private and
government costs increase under the contract and subsidy policies. However, the relative mag-
nitudes of the costs remain roughly the same. The ratio of government costs under subsidies
to government costs under contracts is about 3 at a VMP of $25, falling to 2.2 at a VMP of
$150. Similarly, the ratio of private costs under subsidies to private costs under contracts is
about 0.8 at a VMP of $25, rising to 0.9 at a carbon price of $150. These results show that the
optimal contracting scheme generates substantial cost savings over a wide range of VMP.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a contracting scheme to encourage carbon offsets from forestation
at minimal cost to the government, subject to the landholders having private information about
their opportunity costs of placing land in forest. The optimal contract scheme typically leaves
some rents in landowners’ hands, and so these contracts are second-best in nature. But, assum-
ing that the government is concerned with the budgetary effects of the policy, the contracts are
a much cheaper approach to inducing the expansion or maintenance of forests than a simple,
constantper-unitsubsidy. Inanational-scalesimulation, weﬁndthatforgivenincreasesinfor-
est area government expenditures with contracting are about 40% of those with subsidies. In
absolute terms, contracts lower expenditures by almost $4 billion per year when applied to 50
million acres of land. Since the contracting scheme does not satisfy the equi-marginal princi-
21ple, private opportunity costs are necessarily higher than under the uniform subsidy. However,
we ﬁnd that this difference is small (about $250 million for a 50 million acre increase) relative
to the reductions in expenditures. Thus, the contracting scheme is preferable from society’s
perspective provided there is a modest cost of government funds—in our simulations, at least
$.07 per dollar raised, considerably less than values that are often suggested.
Carbon offsets are a promising approach to reducing the global costs of climate change
mitigation, but additionality presents signiﬁcant obstacles. Besides the potential impacts on
government costs, it must be possible to verify that offsets represent true incremental adjust-
ments so they do not compromise international efforts to achieve real reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. The contracting scheme that we analyze allows governments to identify ex post
the amount of additional forest provided by each landowner and, thus, to make credible claims
for offset credits. In this regard, our contracting scheme offers an important advantage over
a subsidy policy. Knowledge of the distribution over marginal costs allows one to determine
ex ante the expected increments in forest under either policy. However, only the contracts
identify the actual increments in forest ex post because they induce truth telling by landown-
ers. Implementation of the subsidy policy does not reveal additional information about agent
types.
While we analyze optimal contracts when the government purchases offsets, one can
imagine cases in which private agents would be the buyers. For example, if energy producers
are subject to emissions restrictions, they may be allowed to substitute lower-cost offsets for
emissions reductions. In this case, the regulating agency will want to ensure that the offsets are
additional since non-additional offsets would effectively relax the emissions controls. In this
22setting, non-additional offsets would be inexpensive and, thus, particularly appealing to emis-
sions sources. Our contracting scheme is a remedy for this problem. The regulating agency
could require private buyers of offsets to structure contracts following our design. Condi-
tional on their purchasing only additional offsets, private buyers would want to implement our
scheme because it minimizes their costs.
23Figure 1: Figure 1: Optimal contracts with two types of agents







































































25Table 1.  State-level results for a VMP of $100/acre
Maximum Increase in
State forest area forest Contracts Subsidy Contracts  Subsidy
AL 28338 181 12.0 59.5 4.2 1.6
AR 28255 467 32.7 109.3 11.9 6.0
CA 43061 3697 214.7 592.7 128.7 104.9
CO 39886 5136 303.2 610.3 240.4 221.6
CT, MA, RI 5648 49 3.4 15.5 1.0 0.5
DE, MD, NJ 7746 117 8.0 19.2 2.5 1.3
FL 22868 553 36.6 153.8 18.4 12.3
GA 29776 64 4.2 30.7 1.4 0.4
ID 18065 1015 60.9 142.4 38.4 31.9
IL 31023 443 33.0 72.7 7.8 3.3
IN 19395 607 42.1 74.8 13.7 8.0
IA 32803 1478 95.1 158.9 40.1 29.4
KY 21863 283 20.1 61.0 6.1 3.0
LA 21688 240 15.6 62.4 6.8 3.7
ME, NH, VT 27512 166 11.0 46.8 3.7 2.1
MI 27248 193 13.9 48.5 3.8 1.4
MN 42640 1262 84.5 163.0 31.6 19.8
MS 26039 279 19.4 68.3 6.3 2.7
MO 38724 1358 90.0 239.5 41.6 28.8
MT 63515 11894 643.4 1279.9 555.0 531.0
NM 48029 3924 274.7 427.2 121.3 112.1
NY 25895 274 19.1 47.5 6.1 3.2
NC 23768 80 5.4 26.7 1.8 1.0
OH 21038 844 54.7 110.4 22.5 15.3
Eastern OK & TX 55222 3507 221.5 556.0 136.0 109.0
PA 22884 68 4.5 35.0 1.5 0.5
SC 15221 31 2.0 13.7 0.7 0.3
TN 22049 391 26.4 77.6 9.8 5.3
UT 15206 2752 153.8 299.0 123.7 115.8
VA 19299 114 7.8 37.1 2.6 1.0
WV 12972 125 8.6 30.6 2.7 1.5
WI 28717 487 33.5 90.2 11.6 5.6
WY 31873 6504 361.4 684.8 310.5 298.4
Eastern OR & WA 36904 2953 168.8 410.1 107.3 90.3
Western OR & WA 18788 7 0.4 8.0 0.2 0.0
All states 973961 51542 3086.2 6862.9 2022 1773
million dollars
Government costs Private costs
million dollars 1000 acres
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The assumed quadratic relation x(p) = a+d0p+d1p2 implies x0(p) = d0 +2d1p.




(d0+2d1p) = l(q): (13)
31The optimal set of prices p(q) solves equation (13). Assuming d0+2d1p > 0, as is the case
in the numerical results discussed below, the solution requires p < Pc.25 Since negative prices
would yield smaller amounts of forest, at non-negative cost, than could be obtained without
spending anything, we restrict attention to the interval 0  p(q)  Pc.26









The optimal price will be the smallest positive solution, which is induced by the positive
branch from equation (14).27 Taking the positive branch and simplifying, we ﬁnd the rule for












If d1 < 0 this rule will apply for all values of q. But if d1 > 0, for sufﬁciently large values
of q no rational solution will exist. In such a case, there is no positive price that satisﬁes the
optimality condition, and so the appropriate choice is p(q) = 0.
The solution is completed by deriving the optimal transfer function T(q), which is
induced by equation (1). Differentiating the right-side of equation (15) with respect to q, and
25 Note that d0 +2d1p = x0(p), which we would expect to be non-negative. This restriction needs to hold
for all prices under consideration. If d1 >0 then the condition d0+2d1p>0 for all non-negative prices; if d1 <0
then the condition may be reduced to d0+2d1Pc > 0.
26 As noted in footnote 11, requiring p  0 implies a cutoff value ˜ q that is implicitly deﬁned by p(˜ q) = 0.
27 The radical term on the right-hand side of equation (14) is positive, so if d1 < 0 the expression following
the  sign is negative, and hence must be added to the ﬁrst term. But if d1 > 0 the ﬁrst term in equation (14) is
negative, so the solution must entail adding the second expression. In either case, the solution requires using the
positive branch.









Then, combining equations (11) and (16), we obtain the differential equation that describes





The ﬁnal step is to apply the boundary condition, n(q) = 0. To use this condition,
one needs to know the costs associated with placing an increment e in forest. By deﬁnition,










where we take the positive root so as to obtain the smallest positive price.28 Since the agent
will choose e so as to maximize proﬁt, we know c0(e) = p. Thus, integrating the right-hand















Using equations (15), (11) and (19), one can calculate the operating proﬁt for a type q ﬁrm;
28 If d1 >0 the intercept is negative while the second fraction is positive, so we must add the second fraction.
If d1 < 0 the intercept is positive but the second fraction is negative, so again we want to add the second fraction.
33setting the transfer T(q) equal to that operating proﬁt solves the boundary condition n(q) = 0.
It is then straightforward to numerically solve the differential equation (17).
34Table A.1.  Lower and upper bounds of the θ distribution, by state and land quality category
     Land quality 1      Land quality 2      Land quality 3      Land quality 4
State lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
AL 0.010 0.485 0.209 0.658 0.600 0.856 0.528 0.812
AR 0.007 0.349 0.155 0.481 0.539 0.768 0.568 0.786
CA 0.010 0.331 0.114 0.391 0.313 0.594 0.095 0.430
CO 0.009 0.212 0.082 0.204 0.089 0.181 0.203 0.324
CT, MA, RI 0.004 0.406 0.139 0.630 0.539 0.831 0.526 0.786
DE, MD, NJ 0.008 0.322 0.159 0.564 0.467 0.817 0.368 0.795
FL 0.013 0.643 0.180 0.504 0.496 0.757 0.343 0.631
GA 0.018 0.688 0.261 0.742 0.583 0.876 0.413 0.812
ID 0.015 0.597 0.197 0.500 0.239 0.603 0.265 0.557
IL 0.019 0.554 0.236 0.586 0.510 0.811 0.553 0.784
IN 0.015 0.414 0.222 0.528 0.538 0.794 0.589 0.795
IA 0.012 0.315 0.175 0.438 0.414 0.714 0.492 0.722
KY 0.014 0.470 0.231 0.552 0.579 0.813 0.562 0.807
LA 0.010 0.464 0.172 0.523 0.588 0.850 0.436 0.709
ME, NH, VT 0.003 0.574 0.172 0.714 0.617 0.878 0.647 0.839
MI 0.014 0.485 0.228 0.613 0.643 0.875 0.606 0.812
MN 0.011 0.318 0.170 0.490 0.543 0.813 0.573 0.790
MS 0.008 0.444 0.178 0.536 0.579 0.807 0.591 0.812
MO 0.008 0.241 0.136 0.356 0.474 0.674 0.555 0.749
MT 0.007 0.149 0.069 0.138 0.173 0.245 0.180 0.247
NM 0.013 0.613 0.193 0.590 0.100 0.674 0.151 0.690
NY 0.005 0.358 0.152 0.575 0.597 0.836 0.612 0.808
NC 0.015 0.703 0.248 0.693 0.608 0.852 0.522 0.799
OH 0.012 0.287 0.187 0.486 0.585 0.820 0.500 0.807
Eastern OK & TX 0.011 0.377 0.151 0.384 0.362 0.503 0.386 0.547
PA 0.015 0.653 0.269 0.672 0.607 0.888 0.441 0.813
SC 0.016 0.704 0.242 0.730 0.588 0.875 0.446 0.804
TN 0.009 0.334 0.175 0.516 0.541 0.738 0.593 0.799
UT 0.010 0.374 0.108 0.318 0.131 0.311 0.133 0.261
VA 0.008 0.503 0.184 0.604 0.578 0.821 0.543 0.791
WV 0.003 0.295 0.121 0.577 0.447 0.791 0.629 0.874
WI 0.012 0.370 0.209 0.545 0.610 0.830 0.526 0.800
WY 0.010 0.247 0.073 0.187 0.081 0.165 0.103 0.163
Eastern OR & WA 0.011 0.635 0.213 0.565 0.363 0.662 0.147 0.579
Western OR & WA 0.002 0.441 0.159 0.684 0.358 0.920 0.129 0.830
Average 0.010 0.439 0.176 0.522 0.459 0.721 0.427 0.696
35Table A.2.  Price coefficients for the forest response function x(p), by state and land quality category
         Land quality 1          Land quality 2          Land quality 3          Land quality 4
State price price squared price price squared price price squared price price squared
AL 0.00126 -0.00000267 0.00011 0.00000149 0.00023 -0.000000085 0.00065 -0.00000161
AR 0.00186 -0.00000380 0.00029 0.00000252 0.00026 0.000000427 0.00065 -0.00000137
CA 0.00106 -0.00000371 0.00050 0.00000153 0.00156 -0.000001630 0.00305 -0.00000610
CO 0.00205 -0.00000450 0.00080 0.00000314 0.00108 0.000005750 0.00269 -0.00000127
CT, MA, RI 0.00125 -0.00000264 0.00011 0.00000117 0.00029 -0.000000414 0.00059 -0.00000140
DE, MD, NJ 0.00161 -0.00000436 0.00030 0.00000129 0.00040 -0.000000620 0.00054 -0.00000110
FL 0.00075 -0.00000186 0.00043 0.00000241 0.00041 0.000000903 0.00173 -0.00000282
GA 0.00089 -0.00000243 0.00012 0.00000038 0.00028 -0.000000123 0.00072 -0.00000174
ID 0.00119 -0.00000365 0.00004 0.00000222 0.00099 0.000003730 0.00247 -0.00000282
IL 0.00153 -0.00000337 0.00036 0.000000549 0.00056 -0.00000106
IN 0.00184 -0.00000379 0.00035 0.000000480 0.00055 -0.00000125
IA 0.00208 -0.00000428 0.00053 0.000000768 0.00066 -0.00000091
KY 0.00170 -0.00000336 0.00028 0.000000645 0.00055 -0.00000123
LA 0.00139 -0.00000301 0.00028 0.00000212 0.00026 -0.000000151 0.00151 -0.00000319
ME, NH, VT 0.00099 -0.00000144 0.00010 0.00000074 0.00032 -0.000000936 0.00059 -0.00000165
MI 0.00149 -0.00000320 0.00003 0.00000196 0.00025 -0.000000334 0.00057 -0.00000143
MN 0.00190 -0.00000389 0.00014 0.00000246 0.00029 -0.000000035 0.00058 -0.00000135
MS 0.00151 -0.00000291 0.00017 0.00000241 0.00030 -0.000000101 0.00061 -0.00000149
MO 0.00214 -0.00000443 0.00022 0.00000334 0.00032 0.000001340 0.00080 -0.00000150
MT 0.00229 -0.00000532 0.00179 0.00000074 0.00129 0.000004080 0.00365 -0.00000371
NM 0.00109 -0.00000298 0.00012 0.00000015 0.00095 0.000006180 0.00266 0.00000012
NY 0.00162 -0.00000304 0.00013 0.00000179 0.00027 -0.000000432 0.00057 -0.00000146
NC 0.00088 -0.00000238 0.00022 0.000000471 0.00067 -0.00000150
OH 0.00213 -0.00000481 0.00018 0.00000299 0.00026 0.000000292 0.00054 -0.00000121
Eastern OK & TX 0.00167 -0.00000367 0.00080 0.00000216 0.00082 0.000003060 0.00221 -0.00000322
PA 0.00089 -0.00000249 0.00024 -0.000000060 0.00057 -0.00000133
SC 0.00070 -0.00000194 0.00006 0.00000054 0.00027 -0.000000135 0.00074 -0.00000179
TN 0.00180 -0.00000349 0.00014 0.00000256 0.00033 0.000000447 0.00058 -0.00000137
UT 0.00141 -0.00000338 0.00019 0.00000340 0.00087 0.000005470 0.00306 -0.00000092
VA 0.00120 -0.00000246 0.00011 0.00000184 0.00026 0.000000169 0.00058 -0.00000129
WV 0.00172 -0.00000346 0.00019 0.00000138 0.00032 -0.000000657 0.00052 -0.00000137
WI 0.00184 -0.00000385 0.00015 0.00000266 0.00029 0.000000102 0.00056 -0.00000126
WY 0.00205 -0.00000443 0.00150 0.00000257 0.00118 0.000006530 0.00365 -0.00000179
Eastern OR & WA 0.00056 -0.00000231 0.00140 0.000000057 0.00364 -0.00000690
Western OR & WA 0.00036 -0.00000053 0.00007 0.00000048 0.00024 -0.000000404 0.00045 -0.00000112
 
36